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Note
Balancing State Budgets at a Cost
to Fairness in Delinquency Proceedings
Andrea L. Martin*
Imagine a twelve-year-old child of average intelligence who
is charged with a felony count of damage to private property.
The child and parent arrive at the juvenile court on the day of
arraignment and apply for court-appointed counsel for the
child. The court administrator determines that the child quali-
fies for appointed counsel,' and informs the child's parent that
if the child accepts representation, the parent must pay a $100
fee. While waiting to meet with the appointed counsel, the par-
ent tells the child that she refuses to pay the $100 fee and sug-
gests that the child should consider waiving the right to coun-
sel and pleading guilty. The child is torn as to what to do, but
abides by the parent's wishes. This intense conflict of interest
between the parent and the child represents only one of the
many problems with a co-payment statute that requires the
parents ofjuvenile respondents to make a co-payment for court-
appointed counsel.2
Under a recently invalidated Minnesota statute, both
criminal defendants and juvenile respondents using court-
appointed counsel faced a fee ranging from $50 to $200 depend-
ing on the severity of their charges.3 In an attempt to generate
revenue to balance the ailing Minnesota budget,4 the state leg-
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
summa cum laude, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay. I am truly grateful to
Emily Pruisner and Melanie Kleiss for their dedication and time, the Minne-
sota Law Review Board and Staff for their patience, Professor Barry Feld for
his assistance, and Laura Nelson for suggesting this topic. I owe special
thanks to Andrew for his unconditional love, support, and encouragement.
1. See MINN. R. Juv. P. 3.02 (indicating that if the child cannot afford an
attorney, one should be appointed for him or her).
2. See MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
3. Id.
4. See id. As amended, the statute requires that the first $2,740,000 col-
lected as a result of this fee be transferred to the state's general revenue fund.
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islature raised public defender co-payment fees from $28 for
any service5 to $100 for juveniles and a maximum of $200 for
adults with felony charges.6 The Minnesota Supreme Court in-
validated this version of the co-payment statute in State v.
Tennin, which dealt with an adult indigent defendant, because
the statute failed to include an option for judges to waive the
co-payment if it imposed a "manifest hardship" on the defen-
dant.7 Unfortunately, commentators and courts, including the
court in Tennin, have said little, if anything, about the impact
of co-payment or reimbursement statutes on juveniles facing
delinquency charges. The operation of a co-payment require-
ment on the right to counsel affects juveniles differently than
adults for several reasons. Juveniles face a system lacking
some of the procedural safeguards inherent in the adult crimi-
nal system, such as the right to a jury trial,8 in an increasingly
punishment-oriented system; are susceptible to adult coercion;
and may lack the capacity to make good legal decisions.
Part I of this Note describes the separate development of
the right to counsel for adults versus children and depicts the
current trends in the juvenile justice system. It further pro-
vides a background on various attempts to recover the costs of
providing court-appointed counsel through reimbursement
statutes, and concludes with a description of Minnesota's in-
validated attempt to recover costs through co-payment. Part II
gives a brief description of State v. Tennin, which invalidated
the most recent Minnesota co-payment statute,9 and analyzes
the court's assessment of the co-payment statute as applied
separately to adults and juveniles. Part III examines why a co-
payment statute implicating parental liability presents addi-
tional harms to juveniles from a policy standpoint. Finally, Part
IV offers several alternatives that curb at least some of the
negative impacts of a co-payment statute on juveniles. Addi-
tionally, this section provides suggestions to future courts on
interpreting the holding in State v. Tennin in the event that the
proposed alternatives are not adopted. This Note concludes
Id.; see also Amy Mayron, Law on Legal Aid Fee Voided, PIONEER PRESS (St.
Paul), Sept. 3, 2003, at lB.
5. MINN. STAT. § 611.17 (2002) (amended 2003).
6. MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003) (providing tiered amounts for
the co-payment, depending on the degree of the charge).
7. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410-11 (Minn. 2004).
8. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1970) (holding no
constitutional right to jury trials for juveniles at the adjudicative stage).
9. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d at 410-11.
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that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in failing to analyze
the co-payment's application to juveniles separately, because
even if the legislature follows the court's guidance, a revised
statute would still be unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.
Further, even if a future court fails to recognize the constitu-
tional defect of such a statute as applied to juveniles, the legis-
lature should still reconsider the co-payment statute because it
negatively impacts the juvenile's right to counsel, and several
superior alternatives exist.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PAYMENT
FOR THAT RIGHT
The right to counsel for adults has developed separately
from the right to counsel for juveniles. This distinction is espe-
cially important in analyzing State v. Tennin, because the court
in that case sweepingly invalidated the co-payment statute
without acknowledging the differences in the juvenile right to
counsel as compared to the adult right to counsel.
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR ADULTS
The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense."" While some questions still
exist concerning at which stage in a case the right to counsel
attaches 1 and whether certain charges require assistance of
counsel," the adult right to counsel is fairly well established.
As early as 1932, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental
right to effective appointment of counsel in capital cases."
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Compare United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding no
right to counsel for photo identification when the accused was not present),
and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (holding no right to counsel
for show-up identification when accused had not been charged yet), with
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (holding a right to counsel for a
preliminary hearing when determining whether to present the case to a grand
jury), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when the prosecution is at a "criti-
cal stage").
12. See B. Mitchell Simpson, III, A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged with
Misdemeanors Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 417, 417-19 (2000) (describing the discrepancy between what the Su-
preme Court has announced as minimal standards of representation for mis-
demeanor charges and standards that various states have adopted).
13. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (stating that "[tihe duty of
the trial court to appoint counsel under such circumstances is clear," after six
1640 [Vol 88:1638
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Shortly thereafter, the Court further expanded the right to
counsel, stating that federal courts cannot deprive an accused
of life or liberty unless the accused has counsel or has waived
the assistance of counsel. 4 A waiver of the right to counsel
must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right" depending on the facts and circumstances in-
volved in the case, "including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused." 5 This means that the waiver must be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 6
The Court continued to expand and define the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel up through the 1970s. The right
grew to include the right to appointment of counsel for indigent
17defendants charged with felonies, and finally the right to as-
sistance of court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal defen-
dants sentenced to imprisonment, regardless of the classifica-
tion of the offense. 8 While the Court has never required states
to provide counsel for defendants charged with misdemeanor
offenses who are not sentenced to imprisonment, many states,
including Minnesota, 9 have voluntarily chosen to provide coun-
sel in such circumstances. 20 Despite its increased duty to pro-
vide representation to those unable to secure counsel, a state
cannot require that the criminal defendant proceed with coun-
sel if he or she has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived the right.' In contrast to the development of the right
to counsel enjoyed by adults, the juvenile right to counsel
evolved through a unique social and case history.
men were sentenced to death with little assistance of counsel).
14. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
15. Id. at 464.
16. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948).
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339, 343-44 (1963).
18. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, mis-
demeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial").
19. MINN. STAT. § 611.14(1) (2002) (providing the right to representation
by a public defender for "person[s] charged with a felony, gross misdemeanor,
or misdemeanor").
20. Simpson, supra note 12, at 418-19 (indicating that thirty-five states
and the District of Columbia require the appointment of counsel for more than
just defendants charged with misdemeanors sentenced to jail).
21. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (holding that there
is a constitutional right to pro se representation).
1641
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
B. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR JUVENILES
1. The Special History of the Juvenile Court
Founded at the turn of the twentieth century, the juvenile
22
court system is a relatively modern legal invention. Prior to
the mid-nineteenth century, the justice system treated many
juveniles no differently than adults. 3 Starting in the mid-
nineteenth century, however, two child welfare movements
swept America.24 In the first movement, early reformers
thought that new environments with strict discipline could
change a wayward child's character. 25 "Houses of Refuge," re-
formatories for children, sprang up in New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia.6 These reformatories operated on a "parens pa-
triae "2 concept where the state assumed the role of the par-
ent.28 Typically, courts considered these reformatories as
schools that served the therapeutic, vocational, and welfare
needs of juveniles.29 By the 1860s it became clear that these in-
stitutions operated more like child prisons, yet the movement
continued to grow to include six hundred such facilities by
1890.30
During the Progressive Era, spanning approximately 1880
to 1920, juvenile justice underwent a second movement of
22. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS 4 (1978) (describing that in
1899, Illinois created a separate court to deal with the legal problems facing
juveniles).
23. See id. at 36 (indicating that children were frequently incarcerated
with adults and tried by adult proceedings). The age at which children could
be held criminally accountable for their actions varied over time. This age
ranged from seven in the Middle Ages to fourteen by the seventeenth century.
See A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q.
REV. 364, 366, 369 (1937); see also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARv. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909) (indicating that United States common law age
of criminal responsibility in many states was seven or ten).
24. Michael Grossberg, Changing Conceptions of Child Welfare in the
United States, 1820-1935, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (Margaret K.
Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 15-18.
27. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 113, 115-16 (explaining the
nature of the government's responsibility to look out for the welfare of chil-
dren).
28. See Grossberg, supra note 24, at 18.
29. Id.
30. See id.
[Vol 88:16381642
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change."1 Reformers sought to disassociate juveniles from the
stigma of the criminal system and move toward a model based
more on social welfare." In 1899, to effectuate this separation,
Illinois developed a distinct court system designated to handle
only the problems of juveniles. Along with the new court sys-
tem came a new vocabulary, including, for example, "delin-
quent" and "disposition" rather than "criminal" and "sen-
tence.
, 34
The first juvenile courts operated under a general lack of
formal procedure.35 Many reformers perceived the new juvenile
court as curative and a place to demonstrate care for children.3
The reformers considered the new juvenile process advanta-
geous because the system avoided stigmatizing juveniles by
separating them from adults and allowing only limited access
to their proceedings and records.37 Because of the solicitous im-
age of the juvenile court, the law only recognized the child's
right to custody, not to liberty, hence the lack of procedure.38 By
the 1930s, critics observed that the informal approach in juve-
nile courts did little by means of justice, one critic suggesting
that "[t]he powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in com-
parison with those of our juvenile courts. '39 Despite harsh criti-
31. See id. at 31-32.
32. Id. at 46.
33. RYERSON, supra note 22, at 4.
34. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23, 27, 29 (1967).
35. Mack, supra note 23, at 117. Mack noted that "[tihe procedure and
practice of the juvenile court is simple." Id. For procedure, the court notified
children and parents to appear, but refrained from any detention prior to the
hearing unless the offense charged was serious, there was a likelihood of es-
cape, or the home was completely unfit for the child. Id. Mack does not discuss
provisions for deciding detention, nor any other procedural rights guaranteed
to the child. See id. at 117-22 (describing what happened at a juvenile hear-
ing).
36. See id. at 120. Mack artfully expresses the romantic ideal of the juve-
nile court lacking procedure and formality as follows:
The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing
at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a
desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm
around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing
none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of
his work.
Id.
37. BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 16 (1993).
38. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in
the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 587 (2002).
39. Roscoe Pound, Foreword to PAULINE V. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN
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cisms of the juvenile courts, change would not come for another
thirty years.
2. Recognition of a Right to Counsel for Juveniles
In 1967, the Supreme Court addressed some of the inade-
quacies of the juvenile courts in In re Gault,4° which held that
in delinquency adjudications, juveniles are entitled to due proc-
ess under the Fourteenth Amendment.4' In In re Gault, an Ari-
zona juvenile court committed fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault to
the State Industrial School until the age of twenty-one for mak-
ing "lewd remarks" over the telephone to a neighbor.42 Many
modern parents probably would find the procedure employed in
the Gault case appalling. No one notified Gerald's parents upon
taking him into state custody, and the state served neither Ge-
rald nor his parents with a petition.43 The next day, the judge
held an informal hearing where the complainant was not pre-
sent, no written account of the proceeding was recorded, and
the judge questioned Gerald without an attorney. Because
Arizona denied juveniles the right to appeal, the Gaults unsuc-
cessfully pursued a writ of habeas corpus to the Arizona Su-
preme Court.45
The United States Supreme Court, however, agreed to hear
the case and found a right to counsel among many other proce-
dural rights afforded to juveniles under the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 The Court held that the right to counsel existed
for delinquency proceedings in which the juvenile might be
committed to an institution that limited the juvenile's free-
dom.47 As part of that right, the parents and the child must be
notified of their right to counsel, and, if they cannot afford to
retain counsel, the court should appoint representation.48 Pro-
PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, at xxvii (1937).
40. 387 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1967).
41. Id. at 30-31.
42. Id. at 7-8.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 5-6.
45. See In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760, 770 (Ariz. 1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 1
(1967).
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. The Court also held that juveniles have a
right to notice of charges and a privilege against self-incrimination, but it re-
fused to address a juvenile's right to appellate review and a transcript of pro-
ceedings. Id. at 32-33, 49-50, 58.
47. Id. at 41.
48. Id.
1644 [Vol 88:1638
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bation officers, parents, and judges are not sufficient substi-
tutes for counsel. 49 Counsel is necessary to assist juveniles pre-
pare and present a defense, question the facts, deal with the
complexities of the law, and insist that proceedings are handled
lawfully.0
Most states have now codified the juvenile right to coun-
sel."' In fact, at the time of In re Gault, a few states already had
statutes in place that at least allowed juveniles to appear with
counsel.52 The Minnesota statute codifying the juvenile right to
counsel in delinquency matters is very explicit, stating that a
"child has the right to be represented by an attorney" and that
the right attaches by the first court appearance. In a separate
statute, Minnesota grants a right to representation by a public
defender to juveniles aged ten or older,54 except for children
charged with petty offenses.55 Interestingly, this statute states
that "[tihe child, parent, guardian or custodian has the right to
effective assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding
in juvenile court.",6 The statute further provides that if a child
is a petty offender facing a third (or greater) alcohol or con-
trolled substance charge that might carry an alternative dispo-
sition, the child is entitled to appointment of counsel." Whether
or not juveniles exercise that right raises the issue of waiver.
49. See id. at 36. But see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (up-
holding a juvenile's waiver of counsel during a custodial police interrogation
when he asked to talk to his probation officer).
50. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
51. See Tory J. Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National Com-
parison of State Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611, 622 (1996) (indicating
that only Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, and New Hamp-
shire do not have statutes concerning the juvenile's right to counsel).
52. 387 U.S. at 37-38 ("In at least one-third of the States, statutes now
provide for the right of representation by retained counsel in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings, notice of the right, or assignment of counsel, or a combi-
nation of these.").
53. MINN. R. Juv. P. 3.01 (indicating that the attorney for the child
should first meet privately with the child, without parents, guardians, or cus-
todians, and that the attorney is only counsel for the child).
54. MINN. STAT. § 611.14(4) (Supp. 2003).
55. MINN. STAT. § 260B.163 subd. 4(a) (2002).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id. Children who have a series of alcohol- or drug-related offenses
must be evaluated for chemical dependency and can be ordered an alternative
disposition to inpatient or outpatient chemical dependency treatment. MINN.
STAT. § 260B.235 subd. 6 (2002).
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3. Waiver of the Right to Counsel by Juveniles
Similar to adults, juveniles can waive their right to coun-
sel.58 In Fare v. Michael C., the Court held that a "totality-of-
the-circumstances" approach is sufficient to determine whether
a juvenile has waived his or her Miranda rights, 59 but the Court
has never specifically addressed waiver of the right to counsel
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Important factors under
the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test for Miranda waiver in-
clude the juvenile's age, experience, background, intelligence,
and capacity to understand warnings about rights, the nature
of due process rights, and possible consequences of the waiver
of Miranda rights. 60 Despite the constitutional requirements of
the juvenile right to counsel, many questions still exist about
the use and application of waiver to the right to counsel.
Legal experts have conducted significant research regard-
ing the effectiveness and application of waiver requirements. In
1989, Professor Barry Feld of the University of Minnesota pub-
lished a thorough analysis of the right to counsel in Minnesota
juvenile courts.6' In his study, Professor Feld examined the
rates of representation of juveniles for all of Minnesota and its
subsets.62 Using data collected by the Minnesota Supreme
Court's Judicial Information System on delinquency and status
offense cases in 1986,63 Professor Feld found an overall average
representation rate of 45.3% for the state.64 The rates among
the eighty-seven counties in Minnesota varied, however, from
four counties with representation rates of 90% or greater to six
counties with representation rates of 10% or less.65 Professor
Feld found that the children in counties with much higher rates
of representation were removed from their homes far less fre-
quently than children in counties with much lower rates of rep-
58. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979).
59. Id. at 725.
60. Id.
61. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989).
62. Id. at 1209.
63. Id. at 1210.
64. Id. at 1214.
65. Id. Professor Feld revealed similar results when comparing rates of
representation among the states of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
York, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, where New York had the highest rate
of representation at 95.9% and North Dakota had the lowest at 37.5%. FELD,
supra note 37, at 54-55.
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resentation.6 In his conclusions, Professor Feld strongly ques-
tioned the Minnesota standard that juvenile waiver be "know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary."67 Further, Professor Feld sug-
gested a requirement of mandatory, non-waivable counsel,68 or
at least a waiver standard that requires juveniles to consult
with an attorney before waiving the right.69
Other studies have found similar inadequacies in the juve-
nile system. The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a
study at the direction of Congress on juvenile representation in
the mid-1990s, finding again that representation rates and the
effectiveness of representation among states were very incon-
sistent.7 0 The GAO found that among delinquency adjudica-
tions, rates of unrepresented juveniles ranged from only 2.3%
in California and 3.6% in Pennsylvania to about 38% in Ne-
braska.7' In 1993, the American Bar Association cited waiver as
a cause of inadequate counsel for juveniles and many of the
other problems that affect the juvenile system. 72 The ABA rec-
ommended that the Department of Justice and the states col-
laborate to create waiver procedures that would make waiving
counsel more difficult for children.73
To address a number of problems in the juvenile system,
Minnesota created an Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Jus-
tice System in 1992. 74 The Task Force studied the possibility of
granting juveniles a non-waivable right to counsel.7 ' The state
66. Feld, supra note 61, at 1239.
67. Id. at 1323-24.
68. Id. at 1325-26.
69. Id. at 1329.
70. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-95-139, Juvenile Justice: Rep-
resentation Rates Varied as Did Counsel's Impact on Court Outcomes 18
(1995), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/GovPubs/gao/
gao26.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
71. Id.
72. See PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF
CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, ABA, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 60(1993).
73. Id. at 61. Two years later, the ABA completed another report which
questioned waiver standards again. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE
JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
7-8 (1995).
74. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juve-
nile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 986 (1995).
75. Id. at 986-87.
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adopted the suggestions of the Task Force with little change. 76
Prior to the 1994 changes suggested by the Task Force, waiver
in Minnesota only required that the juvenile's waiver be "an
express waiver voluntarily and intelligently made."77 The re-
sulting, current court rule governing waiver in Minnesota still
requires "knowing[], intelligent and voluntar[y]" waiver, but it
also has a number of new, improved protections.7 8 Now the
child must be "informed of the child's right to counsel and the
disadvantages of self-representation by an in-person consulta-
tion with an attorney."7 9 Counsel must "appear with the child in
court and inform the court that such consultation has oc-
curred," ° and if the child waives his or her right to representa-
tion, the statute requires court-appointed stand-by counsel for
children facing felony charges, gross misdemeanor charges, or
out-of-home placement.8' Despite these increased protections
provided to juveniles in Minnesota in 1994, the most recent de-
velopments in juvenile justice have moved away from ensuring
the rights of juveniles to seeking retribution for the actions of
juveniles.
4. The Modern Move Towards Retributivism
Modern notions of juvenile justice are increasingly based
on punishment rather than the rehabilitative ideals of the Pro-
gressive Era.8 2 Recently, the public seems to believe that the
juvenile justice system has not been hard enough on delinquent
juveniles and that offenders should suffer more punishment.83
Current crime policy and ever-ailing budgets prevent legisla-
tors from allocating more resources to expensive rehabilitative
programs for juvenile delinquents.' A number of newer policies
and laws to get tough on juvenile crime reflect a movement
away from the rehabilitative ideals of the Progressive Era to a
just deserts model.85 For example, in the early 1990s, many
76. Id. at 1116-17.
77. MINN. STAT. § 260.155 subd. 8 (1992) (repealed 1999).
78. MINN. R. Juv. P. 3.04.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. MINN. STAT. § 260B.163 subd. 4(b) (2002).
82. N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 27
AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 307, 313-14 (1999).
83. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS 287 (1999).
84. Id. at 288.
85. Reppucci, supra note 82, at 313-14.
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states changed their jurisdictional laws governing the juvenile
court, making it easier to transfer juveniles to adult court.88 In
1989, the Supreme Court held the application of capital pun-
ishment to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds constitutional un-
der the Eighth Amendment.8 7 Under the rehabilitative model,
the juvenile courts used an indeterminate sentencing policy,
basing the disposition on the time needed for rehabilitation.88
Now, however, one-third of the states use the juvenile's offense
record in dispositional decisions through statutory minimum
sentencing guidelines or other administrative guidelines.89 Fi-
nally, while the government supposedly seals juveniles' records
for their protection, the public now has greater access to such
records," and adult criminal sentencing refers to them.91
The requirement that states provide representation for
many adult and juvenile defendants means that the states
must also find funding for this representation. States have re-
peatedly expressed interest in seeking funding for representa-
tion from the defendants themselves.
C. RECOUPMENT THROUGH REIMBURSEMENT STATUTES
States have shown interest in recovering money spent on
court-appointed counsel for over thirty years.92 Every state in
the country, as well as the federal government, has statutes
providing for the recovery of funds spent on court-appointed
representation. While the statutes vary from state to state,
86. David P. Farrington & Rolf Loeber, Serious and Violent Juvenile Of-
fenders, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 207.
87. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1989).
88. Feld, supra note 74, at 1083-84.
89. Id. Despite the use of informal guidelines by many Minnesota courts,
Minnesota has explicitly rejected statewide guidelines in juvenile court. Id. at
1085, 1091.
90. See Reppucci, supra note 82, at 314.
91. Berkheiser, supra note 38, at 646; see also MINN. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES § II.B (2003) (indicating that juvenile offenses are considered in
sentencing decisions as part of the criminal history of an adult offender).
92. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972).
93. Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent
Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a
Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 218
(1998). For example, Minnesota's reimbursement statute is codified at MINN.
STAT. § 611.35 (2002), and requires that defendants represented by public de-
fenders or court-appointed counsel reimburse the government for the services
if they are able to pay. Minnesota also has a separate reimbursement statute
for juveniles codified at MINN. STAT. § 260B.331 subd. 5 (2002) (original ver-
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they generally require criminal defendants to repay the costs of
representation if the defendants were indigent at the time the
court appointed counsel, but have later become able to pay.9'
On two occasions, the Supreme Court has ruled on the validity
of reimbursement statutes and generally accepted them. The
first case, James v. Strange, involved a Kansas statute that
made indigent defendants liable for the amount the state spent
on their behalf.95 If the debtor was unable to pay, the debt at-
tached to the debtor's real property as a lien.96 The Court held
the Kansas statute unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds,97 but chose not to determine whether the statute
impermissibly chilled defendants' exercise of their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.98 While appearing to have no
problem making the indigent defendant a debtor to the state,
the Court found that civil judgment debtors had greater statu-
tory protections, creating an equal protection problem.9 De-
spite the invalidation of this statute, the Court noted in dicta
that reimbursement statutes do serve legitimate state inter-
ests. '00
The second case, Fuller v. Oregon, involved a reimburse-
ment statute through which the court could order a convicted
defendant to repay the costs of his defense if able to pay, unless
the defendant showed that payment would "impose manifest
hardship on the defendant or his immediate family."1 ' The
Court held that this statute did not embody the type of equal
protection violation present in James v. Strange.' While the
statute did include a distinction between convicted and acquit-
ted defendants, the Court held this distinction permissible.
10 3
Most importantly, the Court held that reimbursement statutes
do not infringe on indigent defendants' exercise of their Sixth
sion at MINN. STAT. § 260.251 subd. 4 (1984)), which gives the court authority
to inquire into parents' ability to pay and to order reimbursement for the legal
services provided for their children. This statute was upheld in In re Welfare of
M.S.M., 387 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
94. See Holly, supra note 93, at 218.
95. 407 U.S. at 129-30.
96. Id. at 131.
97. Id. at 140-41.
98. Id. at 134.
99. Id. at 140-42.
100. Id. at 141.
101. 417 U.S. 40, 43 n.5 (1974).
102. Id. at 46-48.
103. Id. at 48-50.
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Amendment right to counsel.1'0 The Court reasoned that the
state provided free counsel during all stages of the criminal
proceedings as required by Gideon v. Wainwright.10 5 The Court
also held that the knowledge of possible future liability for the
costs of representation does not affect eligibility to obtain coun-
sel, and noted that the Oregon statute only applies to people
who actually become able to repay the state.00
Similarly, in Hanson v. Passer, the Eighth Circuit found
Minnesota's recoupment statute, which required defendants to
repay the costs of their defenses as they are able, constitu-
tional. 10 7 For a recoupment statute to be valid, the court inter-
preted Fuller to require exemption from enforcement for those
people truly unable to pay.108
The Supreme Court has never determined to whom the
state can extend liability for the costs of court-appointed coun-
sel, although a few lower courts, including the Minnesota Court
of Appeals,0 9 have addressed the issue. In United States v.
O'Neill,110 a federal district court held a defendant's wife liable
for the costs of her husband's defense."' The court reasoned
that even though the husband committed the crime before the
couple married, the debt incurred during the marriage was for
"necessaries," like medical expenses, food, and shelter, for
which the wife was held liable."' One other federal district
court has adopted this view, 113 along with a number of state
courts."
4
In another case, the federal government tried to render a
private attorney, retained after the defendant had received ser-
vices from a public defender, liable for the costs of the court-
104. Id. at 51-54.
105. Id. at 52-53; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45
(1963).
106. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53.
107. 13 F.3d 275, 279 (8th Cir. 1994).
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
110. 478 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law).
111. Id. at 855.
112. Id. at 854-55.
113. United States v. Conn, 645 F. Supp. 44, 45-46 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (apply-
ing Wisconsin law).
114. See, e.g., Read v. Read, 202 P.2d 953, 957 (Idaho 1949); DuBois, Shee-
han, Hamilton & DuBois v. DeLarm, 578 A.2d 1250, 1255-56 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990); State v. Clark, 563 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Wash. 1977); Warner &
Ryan v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517, 521-22 (1871).
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appointed counsel." 5 Shortly before the trial, the adult defen-
dant's mother paid a substantial amount to obtain private
counsel for the defendant after he had been utilizing the ser-
vices of a court-appointed attorney due to indigence. 16 The gov-
ernment argued that the defendant had access to the large
amount of money used to retain the private attorney at the
time the court appointed counsel." 7 As such, the government
asserted that the private attorney should reimburse the gov-
ernment for the costs of providing court-appointed counsel.
118
Ultimately, however, the Second Circuit found that the defen-
dant never had control of the money used to retain the private
counsel, and therefore did not hold the private attorney liable
for the costs of the court-appointed defense."9
In a Minnesota case, In re Welfare of M.S.M., the district
court ordered the juvenile faced with delinquency proceedings
and/or his parents to reimburse the county $3191 for costs of
the juvenile's representation. 120 The appellate court affirmed,
noting that both of the juvenile's parents were gainfully em-
ployed, allowing them to contribute to the cost of the represen-
tation, and that the parents had a reasonable opportunity to be
heard by the court concerning their ability to pay.121
The judicially validated reimbursement statutes applied in
the above cases constitute one tool to recover the expense of
court-appointed counsel from defendants. Another tool is the
co-payment statute.
D. RECOUPMENT THROUGH CO-PAYMENT STATUTES
In June 2003, the Minnesota State Legislature passed sig-
nificant amendments to a statute that had required a $28 co-
payment for public defender services unless a judge waived
such payment. 2 2 As amended, this recently invalidated statute
eliminated the judicial waiver provision and provided a new
115. United States v. Crosby, 602 F.2d 24, 24 (2d Cir. 1979).
116. Id. at 25.
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 28-30.
120. 387 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
121. Id. at 199-200.
122. MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (2002) (amended 2003). This statute read:
"Upon disposition of the case, an individual who has received public defender
services shall pay to the court a $28 co-payment for representation provided by
a public defender, unless the co-payment is, or has been, waived by the court."
Id.
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tiered schedule for the amount of the co-payment."' The
amount of the required payment depended on the severity of
the charge and the jurisdiction of the court. 124 The statute re-
quired an adult defendant to pay $200 if charged with a felony,
$100 for a gross misdemeanor, or $50 for a misdemeanor. 25 If
the respondent was a juvenile with appointed counsel for a de-
linquency hearing, the parents of the child were required to pay
a $100 co-payment, regardless of the charge.1 2 ' This require-
ment that parents pay on behalf of their children is considera-
bly different from the prior co-payment statute, which merely
required payment from "an individual who has received public
defender services." 7 If defendants could not pay the co-
payment at the time of the appointment, the amendments gave
the state authority to collect the co-payment under Minnesota's
Revenue Recapture Act.' The amended statute allowed repre-
sentation regardless of defendants' ability to pay immedi-
ately.129 Under both the old statute and the amendments,
judges could not make the co-payment part of an offender's sen-
tence or probation. 3 ° Furthermore, the amended statute re-
quired the Public Defenders' Office to transfer the first
$2,740,000 collected from the co-payments to the State of Min-
nesota's general fund.'
In September 2002, the plaintiff in State v. Cunningham
challenged the constitutionality of the prior version of the Min-
nesota co-payment statute. The court held that the statute
withstood constitutional scrutiny because it protected the indi-
gent and did not place a burden on the exercise of the defen-
dant's right to counsel.
133
123. MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Minn. Stat. § 611.17(c) (2002) (amended 2003).
128. See id. For the Revenue Recapture Act, see MINN. STAT. § 270A
(2002).
129. MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (2002) (amended 2003).
130. See id.; MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
131. See MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
132. 663 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
133. Id. at 11. The court, however, did find error in the lower court's appli-
cation of both the co-payment statute and Minnesota's reimbursement statute.
Id. at 13. The trial court had ordered the defendants to pay both the co-
payment and an additional $20 in reimbursement. Id.
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In early September 2003, an adult challenged the constitu-
tionality of the amendments to the co-payment statute for the
first time.3 A Minnesota district judge ruled the statute
unconstitutional because the statute did not allow judges to
waive the fee. 131 Minnesota's Fourth Judicial District refused to
collect the co-payment from adult defendants until the matter
was decided on appeal. 36 The Minnesota Supreme Court
granted accelerated review of the statute in State v. Tennin,
and in February 2004 held the amended co-payment statute
unconstitutional. '37
II. STATE v. TENNIN: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CO-PAYMENTS
A. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN
STATE V. TENNIN
In September 2003, Shawnatee Tennin faced misdemeanor
prostitution charges and qualified for public defender ser-
vices. When the administrator notified her of the $50 co-
payment required under the new statute, Tennin initially re-
fused representation because she could not afford the co-
payment.1 39 After consideration, however, Tennin decided she
did need counsel and paid the $50 co-payment. 40 At the district
court, Tennin challenged the constitutionality of the co-
payment statute. 4 ' Finding her position persuasive, the district
court judge declared the co-payment statute unconstitutional,
and certified the question to the appellate level.
4 1
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted accelerated review,
specifically to address the question "Does Minn. Stat. § 611.17,
subd. 1(c), as amended, violate the right to counsel under the
United States and Minnesota Constitutions?"43 In a brief opin-
134. See Margaret Zack & Pam Louwagie, Public-Defender Fees Thrown
Out, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 4, 2003, at B1.
135. See State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Minn. 2004).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 410-11.
138. Id. at 405.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 405-06.
143. Id. at 406.
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ion, the court answered this question in the affirmative.'" De-
spite the State's arguments to the contrary, the court deter-
mined that the statute did not grant the judiciary express or
implied authority to waive the co-payment, 145 and that the
Revenue Recapture Act did not protect the indigent and "those
for whom repayment would cause a manifest hardship."' Ul-
timately, the court relied exclusively on the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in Fuller, which upheld an Oregon reim-
bursement statute.'47 The court in Tennin reasoned that the
Oregon statute contained two waiver components: (1) defen-
dants can only be ordered to repay legal expenses if they have
the ability to pay; and (2) the repayment costs may be remitted
"if payment 'will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or
his immediate family.""'48 After comparing the Minnesota co-
payment statute to the reimbursement statute in Fuller, the
court found that "the Minnesota co-payment statute has no
similar protections for the indigent or for those for whom such
a co-payment would impose a manifest hardship."'49 Thus, the
court invalidated the entire statute as amended, meaning it
could no longer be enforced in any jurisdiction in the state. 50
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court came to the abso-
lutely correct conclusion, the analysis and support for that con-
clusion are incomplete and provide little guidance for a legisla-
ture set on recovering lost legal expenses. The decision fails to
address the statute's unique application to juveniles and the
inherent differences between the juvenile right to counsel and
the adult right to counsel. Although this Note primarily ana-
lyzes the impact of the recent decision and co-payments in gen-
eral on juveniles, the court's analysis concerning the constitu-
tionality of the statute as applied to adults first requires
consideration. The importance of this analysis lies in the
United States Supreme Court's previous use of comparisons be-
tween the treatment of adults and the respective treatment of
children.''
144. Id. at 410-11.
145. Id. at 409.
146. Id. at 409-10.
147. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 46-50, 51-54; see also supra notes
101-06 and accompanying text.
148. See Tennin, 674 N.W.2d at 408 (quoting Fuller, 417 U.S. at 45-46).
149. Id. at 410.
150. Id. at 410-11.
151. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967) (discussing the differ-
ences in procedural rights for children and adults).
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CO-PAYMENT STATUTE AS
APPLIED TO ADULTS
The constitutionality of reimbursement and co-payment
statutes has thus far hinged on whether or not the statute
grants the court judicial discretion."2 In State v. Tennin, the
court correctly held that the Minnesota co-payment statute as
amended did not conform with the requirement implicitly set
out in Fuller, that courts must have discretion in determining
whether to apply the co-payment and whether to enforce its
application. This decision is consistent with the other precedent
available on reimbursement statutes and co-payment stat-
utes."' The amended Minnesota co-payment statute did not re-
semble the reimbursement statute upheld by the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Hanson v. Passer,"4 or the first Minnesota co-payment
statute at issue in State v. Cunningham,"" because both of
those statutes contained opportunities for judicial discretion.
Thus, if one is only concerned with the adult right to coun-
sel, it appears that the co-payment statute could be easily
remedied by adding a clause which allows for judicial discre-
tion. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the fact
that the court made a sweeping invalidation of Minnesota
Statute section 611.17, subdivision 1(c) (the entire co-payment
provision) using the Sixth Amendment, the court failed to ad-
dress its basis for finding the co-payment unconstitutional as
applied to juveniles. Given the distinct and independent devel-
opment of the juvenile right to counsel, further analysis is re-
quired.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CO-PAYMENT STATUTE AS
APPLIED TO JUVENILES
While correct in eliminating the statute's application to ju-
veniles and adults, the decision in State v. Tennin made no
mention of the portion of the co-payment statute that applied
explicitly to juveniles and their parents."' The court failed to
152. See Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275, 279 (8th Cir. 1994); State v. Cun-
ningham, 663 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
153. See Hanson, 13 F.3d at 279; Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d at 11.
154. 13 F.3d at 279.
155. 663 N.W.2d at 11.
156. See State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Minn. 2004) (quoting the
language of Minnesota Statute section 611.17, subdivision 1(c), but using an
ellipsis to exclude the portion of the statute as it applied to juveniles and their
parents). The court explained three ways that the amended co-payment stat-
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recognize that the statute applied slightly differently to juve-
niles than it did to adults in two ways. First, the juvenile right
to counsel is based on the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
the Sixth Amendment.15 ' Since the Sixth Amendment only ap-
plies to adults, an invalidation of a statute applied to juveniles
must rest on a different constitutional basis. Next, because the
statute actually required that the juvenile's parents pay the
$100 co-payment, some additional legal questions arise about
imputing liability for the juvenile's constitutional rights to the
parent. Only fairly weak precedent exists on requiring third
parties to bear the cost of reimbursement,' much less the cost
of a co-payment, but the court overlooked these weighty consti-
tutional issues.
1. Application of the Co-Payment Statute to the Parents of
Juvenile Respondents
Legally, the doctrine of necessaries and other situations
involving parental liability for their children support the appli-
cation of a co-payment to parents. While the co-payment stat-
ute invalidated in Tennin would have presented due process
problems for parents, revising the statute to provide for judicial
discretion as prescribed by Tennin would probably resolve this
particular problem.
In Minnesota, as in every other state, parents have both a
legal and moral duty to provide necessaries for their children. 15 9
Certainly, necessaries include things such as food, clothing,
shelter, and even medical care,' 60 but some problems do arise in
classifying legal expenses as necessaries. Similar to the situa-
tion of the wife held liable for the defense expenses of her hus-
band in O'Neill,'6' liability for the defense expenses of children
could extend to their parents. 62
ute changed the prior co-payment statute, but never mentioned the change
requiring payment from the parents ofjuvenile respondents. Id. at 406.
157. Compare supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
right to counsel for adults), with supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text
(explaining the right to counsel for juveniles).
158. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
159. See Lufkin v. Harvey, 154 N.W. 1097, 1097 (Minn. 1915) (establishing
that parents have a responsibility to provide the necessaries of life for their
minor children).
160. See id. (discussing medical care as a necessary).
161. United States v. O'Neill, 478 F. Supp. 852, 854-55 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
162. See In re Welfare of M.S.M., 387 N.W.2d 194, 199-200 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
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Even if the common law doctrine of necessaries does not
include legal expenses, statutorily imposed parental liability for
juveniles' torts and restitution orders has generally survived
constitutional challenge.'63 Courts that have held parents liable
for their children's tort and restitution expenses have empha-
sized the importance of (1) notice to the parents that restitution
or damages were being sought, and (2) a hearing that allowed
the parents to present argument, cross-examine witnesses, and
object as a part of due process.'64 The Minnesota co-payment
statute invalidated in Tennin did not afford parents either of
these opportunities. 6 ' Rather, the statute imputed absolute li-
116
ability on the parents, which probably violated the parents'
rights to due process. Thus, revising the co-payment statute to
allow courts to hear the parents and consider their ability to
pay the co-payment is probably sufficient to fulfill the due proc-
ess rights of parents.
2. Application of the Co-Payment Statute to Juveniles
Even though adding a judicial waiver provision would cure
the statute's application to adults and to parents, a judicial
waiver provision would not cure the constitutional problem of
the statute as applied to juveniles. In Tennin, the court failed
to acknowledge two critical elements of the statute as applied
to juveniles: (1) that the juvenile's right to counsel is based on
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,"6 7 rather
than the Sixth Amendment, on which Fuller v. Oregon is
based,'168 and (2) that the co-payment statute applied to the par-
ents of the juveniles, rather than the juveniles themselves. Had
the United States Supreme Court intended the juvenile's right
to counsel to be the same as an adult's right, the Court proba-
bly would have based In re Gault on the Sixth Amendment,
rather than the Fourteenth.
69
163. E.g., In re B.D., 720 So. 2d 476, 479 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that extending liability to parents for the actions of their children is within the
legitimate police powers of the state).
164. E.g., id.
165. See MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
166. See id.
167. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
168. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51 (1974) (dealing with an adult's
right to counsel).
169. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37.
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While little precedent exists to distinguish what protec-
tions the Fourteenth Amendment affords juveniles, at a mini-
mum the Fourteenth Amendment requires counsel as "part of a
fair hearing required by due process."7° In Minnesota, the right
to counsel belongs to the juvenile, not the parents. 17' The co-
payment imposes a hurdle to this component of due process for
the juvenile by implicating parental liability. 172 The co-payment
statute frustrates the juvenile's straightforward due process
right to counsel by making a parent, whose interests may con-
flict with the juvenile's interests, responsible for paying for the
juvenile's right to counsel. Even with the possibility of judicial
waiver, this statute creates a financial incentive for parents to
coerce their children into waiving counsel. Judicial waiver un-
der this type of statute would do more to protect the parent's
due process rights than to protect the juvenile's right to coun-
sel. Because co-payment statutes implicating parents, even
with judicial waiver as required in Tennin, compromise a juve-
nile's right to counsel, the co-payment statute violates the
Fourteenth Amendment when applied to juveniles. Thus, the
Minnesota co-payment statute will continue to suffer constitu-
tional problems under the Fourteenth Amendment even if the
invalidated statute is reformed to include the judicial waiver
provision that Tennin seems to require.
Facially, imposing a parental co-payment requirement
with judicial discretion may seem rather similar to applying a
reimbursement statute to a parent, such as in In re Welfare of
M.S.M.73 However, the temporal difference in the application of
these statutes provides a significant distinction.174 The immi-
nence of a co-payment is considerably greater than the remote
possibility of reimbursement. The co-payment is an obligation
established at the onset of representation, 175 whereas a reim-
bursement generally is not determined until representation has
commenced (and usually finished) and the State has brought a
separate proceeding to recoup the cost of that representation. 76
170. Id. at 38-40 (quoting CHILDREN'S BUREAU OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURTS 57 (1966)).
171. MINN. R. JUV. P. 3.01.
172. See MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
173. 387 N.W.2d 194, 199-200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
174. See supra notes 92-94, 122-31 and accompanying text.
175. See MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
176. See MINN. STAT. § 611.35 (2002).
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This difference stands out against the holding in Fuller, which
indicated that knowledge of possible reimbursement in the fu-
ture does not chill the exercise of the right to counsel. 177 Be-
cause the co-payment is determined at the time of representa-
tion, the possibility of co-payment motivating a parent to
interfere with his or her child's representation is much greater
than the more remote possibility of reimbursement motivating
such interference.
Additionally, as society moves further away from the origi-
178 du
nal rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court, the due
process requirement of the right to counsel should not be com-
promised or frustrated. Juveniles already face a system that
denies them the full array of procedural protections afforded to
adults. 79 When juveniles face increasing risks of punishment
and long-term consequences, ° the due process requirement of
the right to counsel is a necessary safeguard to ensure that ju-
veniles are treated fairly under the law.' The co-payment stat-
ute alters the operation of the juvenile right to counsel, and ex-
poses juveniles to additional risks of unfair treatment by
making it less likely that counsel is present. Additional risks of
unfair treatment seem especially inappropriate if the possible
consequences of a juvenile delinquency adjudication are also
enhanced.
Thus, while the Minnesota Supreme Court in essence
found the Minnesota co-payment statute unconstitutional as
applied to juveniles by invalidating the entire statute, the court
failed to differentiate between the adult and juvenile rights to
counsel. Further, the court neglected to recognize the statute's
unique application to juveniles and their parents. Simply add-
ing a provision to the statute granting judges discretion to
waive the application and enforcement of the statute only
remedies the constitutional problems of the statute as applied
to adults and the parents of juveniles, but not as applied to ju-
veniles.
177. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974).
178. See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding
there is no right to jury trials for juveniles).
180. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
181. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 39 (1967).
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA
CO-PAYMENT STATUTE AS APPLIED TO JUVENILES
Even if the courts wrongfully validate a Minnesota co-
payment statute that is merely amended to include judicial dis-
cretion, the legislature should still reconsider a co-payment
statute's application to juveniles' parents for three reasons. A
statute applying to "the parents of the child" does not account
for adolescents' diminished decision-making ability and suscep-
tibility to parental coercion, potential statutory conflicts with
the waiver statute, and absurd results which occur when apply-
ing the statute in certain situations.
A. JUVENILES LACK ADULT CAPACITY TO MAKE INDEPENDENT
RATIONAL DECISIONS
Social scientists question whether juveniles can truly make
informed, intelligent legal decisions.182 There is evidence that
adolescents do not have a fundamental understanding of what
it means for something to be a "right." 183 While older juveniles
aged sixteen to nineteen have fairly good comprehension and
understanding of Miranda warnings, younger juveniles do not
exhibit the same level of understanding.'84 Additionally, even if
juveniles understand rights, this does not mean that they are
as able as adults to assert those rights.8 5 Frequently, juveniles
have misconceptions about legal counsel, including that an at-
torney can disclose attorney-client privileged information to the
judge, and that attorneys are dishonest.' 8 While many older
adolescents have acquired problem-solving and reasoning skills
similar to adults, 87 their judgment in making decisions is quite
dissimilar to adults. Juveniles use information differently
than adults and assign different values to outcomes than
182. See Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youth's Capacities as Trial
Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 139 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000).
183. Id. at 148-49. Grisso indicates that when asked "'what should happen'
if a judge at a hearing discovers that a youth 'wouldn't talk to the police,'"
somewhere between 50% and 66% of the adolescents thought that person
could be penalized for exercising the right against self-incrimination. Id. at
149.
184. Id. at 149.
185. Reppucci, supra note 82, at 317.
186. Grisso, supra note 182, at 154-55.
187. Id. at 159.
188. Id. at 163.
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adults.189 For example, juveniles value risk less than adults by
weighing possible positive outcomes more than possible nega-
tive outcomes, and they discount the impact of their decisions
on the future more than adults.19° Additionally, researcher
Elizabeth Scott believes that juveniles are subject to the influ-
ence of their parents, and therefore generally make less inde-
pendent decisions. 9' Although juveniles attain a greater degree
of autonomy by adolescence, they are still subject to significant
parental influence. 92
Because of juveniles' relatively undeveloped decision-
making ability, their susceptibility to parental coercion, and
the nature of juvenile waiver of the right to counsel, a co-
payment statute increases the possibility of juveniles making
poor choices about the exercise of their Fourteenth Amendment
right to counsel.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: A juvenile
and her parent arrive at the juvenile court and fill out the ap-
plication for court-appointed counsel. The administrator sug-
gests that the juvenile qualifies for a public defender, based on
the juvenile's assets, 193 and explains that the parent will have
to pay $100 for the juvenile's representation. Because of the op-
eration of the Minnesota waiver statute, the juvenile must
meet with the attorney regardless of whether the juvenile ac-
cepts representation.9 While the parent and juvenile wait for
the juvenile's opportunity to meet with the attorney, the parent
tells the juvenile that the parent does not want to pay the $100,
and that the juvenile should think about refusing representa-
tion. Although the public defender has an opportunity to dis-
cuss the drawbacks of declining representation, 95 the juvenile
still knows that her parent does not want to pay the fee. The
juvenile thinks about the risks of declining, decides that the
risks are not that significant, and declines.98 The juvenile steps
into court with the attorney, waives her right to representation,
and the attorney acknowledges that he or she discussed the
189. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in
Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 221, 232-33 (1995).
190. Grisso, supra note 182, at 161-63.
191. Scott, supra note 189, at 229.
192. Id. at 230.
193. See MINN. R. JUv. P. 3.02.
'194. See MINN. R. JUv. P. 3.01.
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
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ramifications of making this decision." 7 This juvenile, being
susceptible to parental coercion (unlike an adult),' discounts
the risks of waiving the right to counsel (more so than
adults), 99 and waives a constitutional right because of the op-
eration of the co-payment statute. The likelihood of this sce-
nario occurring demonstrates that the statute does not com-
pensate adequately for the juvenile's undeveloped decision-
making ability and susceptibility to parental coercion that in-
crease the possibility of juveniles relinquishing constitutional
rights.
B. THE STATUTE COMPROMISES STATUTORY WAIVER PROGRESS
In addition, introducing parents into the representation
process reverses some of the progress made by the 1994
amendments to the waiver procedure."' Recall the drastic im-
provements made by the 1994 amendments, which included re-
quiring juveniles to meet with an attorney before waiving the
right to counsel and requiring the attorney to appear in court
with the juvenile to acknowledge the juvenile's awareness of
such a decision.2"' Unfortunately, applying the co-payment
statute to the parents of juveniles reintroduces the problem of
• 202
coercive parents, which the amendments sought to resolve.
As enacted, the juvenile waiver statute effectively avoided pos-
sible parental influence on the juvenile's decision to accept or
decline counsel by removing parents from the process.2 3 Con-
sider again the hypothetical presented earlier, in which a par-
ent suggests that a juvenile waive the right to counsel in light
of the co-payment and the juvenile does just that.20 4 The Minne-
sota juvenile waiver statute and the adult constitutional test
require that a waiver of the right to counsel be knowing, intel-
ligent, and voluntary.2 °9 In the hypothetical, the child made a
197. See MINN. R. JUv. P. 3.01.
198. Scott, supra note 189, at 229-30.
199. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. MINN. R. Juv. P. 3.04 cmt. (emphasizing that juveniles should
meet with the attorney outside of the presence of their parents).
203. See MINN. R. JUV. P. 3.04.
204. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. But see Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170-71 (1986) (holding that on the question of volun-
tariness, only coercive actions by the government should be considered). When
considering the juvenile-parent situation, an issue of fairness may exist, but
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waiver of counsel that was possibly knowing and intelligent,
but was only questionably voluntary. Application of a co-
payment statute to the parents of juveniles creates a new con-
flict of interest between the financial interests of the parent
and the legal best interests of the juvenile, which the waiver
statute was not designed to address. Therefore, a co-payment
statute applying to parents conflicts with an underlying pur-
pose of existing state law regarding waiver of the right to coun-
sel for juveniles, compromising the progress of the 1994 waiver
amendments.
C. ABSURD RESULTS WHEN APPLIED TO SOME FAMILIES AND
SITUATIONS
Finally, the application of this statute produces absurd re-
sults in two regularly occurring situations in juvenile court.
First, the statute is difficult to apply to families in the child
protection system, where the child commits a crime while in
the custody of the state. The second situation arises when the
parent is a victim of the child's criminal behavior.
Because the statute does not define "parents," liability for
the co-payment could potentially extend to a number of parties,
some of them probably unintended. ' °6 This problem becomes es-
pecially apparent when considering the application of the stat-
ute to families whose structures fall outside of the stereotypical
two-parent family. Consider the following possibility: A county
removes a child from the home of her single mother through a
207
child protection action. Because the father's parentage is not
legally established, the court places the child in foster care. Af-
ter the child commits a crime, the state charges the child under
the applicable delinquency statutes that would qualify the ju-
venile for court-appointed counsel. Who pays the co-payment?
In this hypothetical, depending on the interpretation of
"parents," a number of people could be required to pay the co-
payment. The definition of "parent" could include the biological
Connelly closes the door on constitutional claims of involuntariness based on
parental coercion. However, given that the government is requiring the parent
to make the co-payment, the subsequent parent-child conflict of interest re-
garding waiver could very well be characterized as governmental coercion.
206. See MINN. STAT. § 611.17(c) (Supp. 2003).
207. See generally MINN. STAT. § 260C.201 subd. 1(a)(2)(ii) (2002) (outlin-
ing how "best interests" can lead to removal to an appropriate social services
agency).
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parent, legal guardian, or custodial parent.2 °8 First, the statute
could require the biological mother, who lost custody of the
child, to pay.2°9 The mother is the "parent" of the juvenile,
which cuts in favor of her liability.20 However, if the mother's
parental responsibility to care for the child has been taken
away, then perhaps her responsibility to pay the co-payment is
absolved as well. Alternatively, the father is also a "parent" of
the child.211 If the court does not formally recognize his rights to
the child, however, it is probably improper to require him to
pay. In still another option, the foster parent could be required
to pay the co-payment. The foster parent is the legal guardian
of the child, but requiring the foster parent to pay would seem
especially inappropriate given the generosity of the foster par-
ent in caring for the child. Finally-the most absurd result-
the county or social service agency could pay the state, because
in this situation the county or social service agency would have
custody of the child.212 The hypothetical represents a distinctly
plausible scenario.21 ' As none of these alternatives seems espe-
cially appropriate, the legislature should reconsider the opera-
tion of the statute.
Another plausible but absurd application of the statute
manifests when the parent is the victim of the juvenile's mis-
conduct. Consider another hypothetical situation, in which a
child assaults his parent, resulting in a delinquency petition
against the child. The statute requires the victimized parent to
pay for the defense of his or her assailant. This situation pre-
208. The co-payment statute did not offer a definition of "parent." See
MINN. STAT. § 611.17 (Supp. 2003). The delinquency and child protection sec-
tions of Minnesota statutory law provide that a parent is "the birth or adoptive
parent of a minor." MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.007 subd. 10, 260C.007 subd. 25
(2002). Applying this narrow definition to the co-payment statute would seem
to conflict with Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Procedure 3.07, which grants a
right to counsel to the parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian once the alle-
gations of a delinquency petition have been proven. See MINN. R. JUV. P. 3.07.
209. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.331 subd. 1(c) (2002) (requiring parents to
contribute to the cost of care under most circumstances).
210. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.007 subd. 10, 260C.007 subd. 25.
211. See id.
212. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201 subd. 1(a)(2)(ii).
213. See U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of General Demographic Characteris-
tics: 2000, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?geo-id=
01000US&ds name=DEC_2000_SFlU&qr-name=DEC2000_SF1 UDP1&_
lang=en&-sse=on (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). Using United States Census in-
formation from 2000, of 34,588,368 family households living with their own
children, only 24,835,505 or 71.8% consist of some form of married couples liv-
ing with their own children. See id.
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sents an enormous conflict of interest and unfair burden for the
parent.
In consideration of these detrimental and serious policy
implications, legislative action changing the operation of the co-
payment statute is necessary.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Assuming that the legislature amends the co-payment
statute to include judicial waiver, there are three ways that
such a co-payment statute or the juvenile waiver statute could
be further amended or reformed to make the operation of a co-
payment statute more fair as applied to juveniles. Viable alter-
natives include (1) making counsel mandatory/non-waivable for
juveniles facing delinquency hearings, (2) amending the co-
payment statute to apply directly to juveniles rather than to
their parents, or (3) not applying a co-payment statute to juve-
niles entirely. Optimally, the legislature should eliminate the
application of the co-payment statute to juveniles. Ultimately,
however, if the courts validate a co-payment statute that im-
poses liability on parents for their children's co-payments and
the legislature refuses to eliminate that parental role from the
statute, future courts should broadly construe the application
of Tennin214 in favor of juveniles.
A. MAKE COUNSEL NON-WAIVABLE FOR JUVENILES
The legislature could amend the juvenile waiver statute to
make representation by counsel mandatory, prohibiting juve-
niles from waiving their right to counsel.215 Juvenile justice ex-
perts continue to vigorously proffer mandatory counsel as a so-
lution to due process shortcomings in the juvenile system.216
A mandatory representation rule would benefit juveniles
and the system in four ways. First, it would eliminate the Four-
teenth Amendment problem.217 Even though parents would still
be implicated through the co-payment statute, the juvenile's
right to counsel under this option would be absolute, without
any opportunity for interference. Mandatory counsel would
eliminate the possibility of parents coercing their children into
waiving their right to counsel by eliminating the choice to
214. See State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 2004).
215. See FELD, supra note 37, at 244-45.
216. See Berkheiser, supra note 38, at 640; Feld, supra note 61, at 1325.
217. See supra notes 40-41, 46 and accompanying text.
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waive that right to counsel.218 Furthermore, this option would
offset the impact of juveniles' undeveloped decision-making ca-
pacity.219 Next, a system that ensures a fair procedure would
increase the political legitimacy of the system.22 ° Similarly, ju-
veniles participating in a system that they perceive as fair will
respond more positively to their experience with the juvenile
221
system.
Requiring mandatory counsel has two drawbacks. Manda-
tory counsel could violate juveniles' right to counsel by denying
them the opportunity to appear pro se and could dramatically
increase administration costs. First, while the Supreme Court
has not ruled on this issue specifically as to juveniles, in
Faretta v. California the Supreme Court held that inherent in
the right to counsel is a right to appear without counsel."22
Minnesota carefully considered this ruling when drafting the
1994 amendments to the juvenile waiver statute.223 By not al-
lowing juveniles to waive counsel, a mandatory counsel statute
could violate the juvenile's right to appear without counsel.
Second, requiring mandatory counsel would demand more
from Minnesota public defenders. Professor Barry Feld indi-
cated that in 1994, one year after Minnesota amended the ju-
venile waiver statute to require consultation with counsel prior
to waiver, the case loads of the public defenders in Minnesota's
Third Judicial District increased 146%.224 Presumably, making
the requirements of representation even stricter would prove
even more costly. Unfortunately, the costs of representation
and budget shortfalls caused the legislature to step in the di-
rection of co-payments initially, so it is doubtful that they
would expand the demands on the public defender offices fur-
ther.225 Even with the co-payment statute and the reimburse-
ment statute, it is doubtful that the state could afford this op-
tion.
218. See FELD, supra note 37, at 244-45.
219. See FELD, supra note 83, at 136.
220. Berkheiser, supra note 38, at 641.
221. Id. at 643.
222. 422 U.S. 806, 834, 836 (1975).
223. See MINN. R. JUV. P. 3.01 cmt.
224. Feld, supra note 74, at 1121.
225. See Mayron, supra note 4.
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B. REMOVE THE PARENTAL BURDEN
Alternatively, the state could apply a co-payment statute
with judicial waiver directly to juveniles by removing the pa-
rental burden. These changes would essentially restore the co-
payment statute to its pre-amendment status, only with in-S226
creased co-payment amounts. Under the proposed changes,
the co-payment would only apply to those juveniles financially
able to pay, thus eliminating possible parental influence on ju-
veniles' decisions about counsel.227 Eliminating parents from
the co-payment process would solve the Fourteenth Amend-
ment problem by eliminating the conflict of interest between
the juvenile and the financial interest of the parent.2 ' Fur-
thermore, this alternative would protect the 1994 waiver
amendments, preserving the juvenile's ability to waive counsel
under the totality of the circumstances.2 2 ' This kind of co-
payment statute has already been validated by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. 20 Legally, this option would probably be con-
stitutional under Fuller v. Oregon23' and State v. Tennin23 2 be-
cause the amended statute allows for judicial discretion.
For juveniles who could afford the co-payment, however,
this option is nearly as bad as the option presented to juveniles
under the invalid co-payment statute. Because of juveniles' di-
minished decision-making ability, 2 3 some juveniles may dis-
count the long-term value of representation to avoid the imme-
diate cost of the co-payment. Additionally, probably few
juveniles can afford such a large co-payment, so practically the
state would recover little from applying the co-payment statute
directly to juveniles. Also, identifying juvenile assets apart
from parental assets may prove especially problematic in some,
if not many, situations. While the state may recover slightly
more money under this option, a financial incentive for making
a poor decision still remains for some juveniles, and a better al-
ternative exists.
226. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part III.A.
228. See supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
229. See MINN. R. Juv. P. 3.04.
230. See State v. Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
231. 417 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1974).
232. See 674 N.W.2d 403, 410-11 (Minn. 2004).
233. See supra Part III.A.
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C. Do NOT APPLY THE CO-PAYMENT REQUIREMENT TO
JUVENILES
Finally, while the other proffered solutions are all plausi-
ble, eliminating the co-payment's application to juveniles and
relying entirely on the reimbursement statue would most likely
serve as the most effective option. Under this option, the legis-
lature, in rewriting the invalid statute, would omit the portion
of the co-payment statute as it pertains to juveniles. This op-
tion is especially effective because it provides juveniles the
most protection from poor decision making2 34 and parental coer-
cion without tremendous additional administrative costs.
235
Furthermore, it safeguards the 1994 amendments to the waiver
statute.
Removing parents from the process corrects the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional problem by ensuring that juveniles
will enjoy a right to counsel that is unhampered by a conflict of
interest.236 Similarly, this option would eliminate a good portion
of coercion by parents and would not implicate the diminished
decision-making ability of juveniles by fully eliminating par-
ents from the process and by preventing the application of the
co-payment statute directly to juveniles.237 Eliminating parents
would likewise make certain that the juvenile waiver statute
protects juveniles as the state had intended in the 1994
amendments.238
The drawback to this solution is the lost revenue from
eliminating the co-payment statute's application to juveniles.
Considering the additional judicial resources required to evalu-
ate juveniles' financial positions, the likelihood that many ju-
veniles could not afford a co-payment, and the dramatic ex-
pense of mandatory counsel,239 this solution is not significantly
more expensive than the other solutions.
Additionally, if the parents of juvenile respondents are
truly able to contribute to the cost of the juvenile's defense, the
state could use the existing reimbursement statute to recover
the costs or partial costs of the defense.240 Relying on the reim-
234. See supra Part III.A.
235. Cf supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
236. Cf supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part III.A.
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. Cf supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
240. See MINN. STAT. § 611.35 (2002); see also MINN. STAT. § 260B.311
subd. 5 (2002) (allowing courts to charge parents for their child's attorney
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bursement statute is legally rational, considering that the
Eighth Circuit has already found Minnesota's reimbursement
statute constitutional as applied to adults,"' and the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has upheld the use of the reimbursement
statute as applied to the parents of juveniles.242 While the
threat of repayment may still operate on these parents when
the state or court determines that they can afford repayment,
because of the temporal difference between when the co-
payment and the reimbursement statutes are assessed, the po-
tential for parental coercion is diminished, 43 making this the
best available alternative.
D. A COMMENT TO FUTURE COURTS
In the event that the legislature does adopt a co-payment
statute with judicial waiver, but which places responsibility for
the co-payment statute on parents, and courts refuse to invali-
date such a statute as applied to juveniles on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, future courts should cautiously apply
such a statute. The court in State v. Tennin cautions that a co-
payment requirement should not be enforced if it imposes
"manifest hardship" on the defendant.2" The court, however,
does not provide a clear definition of what a co-payment must
do to impose "manifest hardship" on a defendant. ' 45 While the
court does not explicitly say that "manifest hardship" refers
only to financial hardship, this is the logical inference from the
court's use of the phrase. 46 Presumably, in the context of the
adult right to counsel, "manifest hardship" would most likely be
financial hardship. However, "manifest hardship" for a juvenile
and the juvenile's parent may include contexts outside of the
financial realm, and thus such a statute should be liberally
construed so as to include such hardships. This would be most
applicable in the situations that produce absurd results when
the statute is applied, such as the victimized parent situation
247or the juvenile in foster care situation. Although all those
fees).
241. See Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275, 279 (8th Cir. 1994).
242. In re Welfare of M.S.M., 387 N.W.2d 194, 199-200 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
243. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
244. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 408-11 (Minn. 2004).
245. See generally id.
246. See id. at 407, 410-11.
247. See supra Part III.C.
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parties may have the financial wherewithal to afford the co-
payment, payment would impose a manifest hardship and
should not be applied. Furthermore, the court could view the
application of such a statute to juveniles as "manifest hardship"
generally because it compromises their independent decision to
employ counsel and jeopardizes the protections of the juvenile
waiver statute. Carefully assessing individual juveniles' situa-
tions and applying a liberal understanding of "manifest hard-
ship" could provide additional protection to juveniles facing a
co-payment statute.
CONCLUSION
The Minnesota legislature should proceed with caution in
redrafting the co-payment statute. If the legislature strictly
adheres to the guidance given by the court in State v. Tennin,
the resulting statute would still violate juveniles' right to coun-
sel under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if later courts
found such a revised statute constitutional, juveniles face cer-
tain challenges that adults do not encounter, and thus the leg-
islature should reconsider applying a co-payment statute to ju-
veniles and their parents.
Co-payment statutes have a number of negative implica-
tions for juveniles facing delinquency charges. Juveniles are
naturally immature in their decision-making processes as com-
pared to adults. Juveniles' lack of experiences as compared to
adults leads juveniles to discount possible risks and conse-
quences more than adults. Unlike adults, juveniles also face
parental influence that can be potentially coercive, especially
considering that juveniles do not make decisions as independ-
ently as adults. Introducing additional external pressures that
the waiver statute designers did not anticipate compromises
the progress made by the 1994 waiver amendments. Further-
more, assuring full compliance with due process for juveniles is
increasingly important as society becomes more interested in
punishing juveniles, rather than pursuing the rehabilitative
ideals of an earlier time. Finally, co-payment statutes implicat-
ing parental liability also present some absurd results when
applied to the less than perfect family circumstance.
Eliminating an amended statute's applicability to juveniles
and relying on the reimbursement statute would resolve these
problems most effectively. Other, perhaps less effective or more
costly options also exist, such as making counsel mandatory for
juveniles or making a co-payment waivable while eliminating a
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parental burden. In the event that the legislature reenacts the
co-payment statute with parental liability, future courts may
be able to curb some of the absurd results of applying such a
statute by interpreting "manifest hardship" broadly. However,
many negative impacts on juveniles would remain. Not subject-
ing juveniles to co-payment statutes is the only foolproof way to
avoid the negative impacts of such a statute on juveniles, and
perhaps the value of fairness in the system is worth the finan-
cial cost to the state.
